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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: 
Development impact fees and exactions are financing mechanisms that local 
governments increasingly use to finance the cost of public infrastructure.  The primary 
reason that local governments favor development impact fees and exactions to finance 
public infrastructure is that the costs associated with growth falls on developers.  Two 
legal cases --Golden v. The Planning Board of The Town of Ramapo, New York and the 
Construction Industry Association of Sonoma County v. The City of Petaluma, 
California-- serve as the basis for the support of development impact fees and exactions 
as a method to manage growth (So & Getzels: 53, 1988). 
Local governments began the use of development exactions for infrastructure as 
early as the 1920s (Stein: 117, 1988).  Due to the high costs associated with extending 
water and sewer lines, as well as streets, local governments began to adopt development 
exactions.  The introduction of exactions to defray the cost of schools and parks began in 
the 1940s (Stein: 117, 1988).  Since capital spending has not kept pace with inflation, 
local governments have used exactions to manage growth (Stein: 118, 1988). 
From 1978 forward, local governments have increasingly turned to impact fees to 
fund the capital expenditures needed for schools, parks, sewer and water lines, streets, 
and other public infrastructure. When California taxpayers voted to approve Proposition 
13 in 1978, local governments experienced a substantial decline in their tax base, which 
resulted in a reduction of money available for public infrastructure.  The passage of 
Proposition 13 also linked California’s burgeoning anti-tax movement to the use of 
development impact fees. 
 5 
 Frank and Downing (1986, 5-6) indicate impact fees and exactions have 
gained favor among local governments for the following reasons: 
 Existing taxpayers are protected from costs associated with new 
development. 
 Communities can synchronize the development with the installation of 
new infrastructure. 
 Price discipline is imposed on development because it forces development 
to internalize infrastructure costs in finished development prices. 
 Quality of life within communities is enhanced since communities with 
deficient facilities can, to some extent, assess new development to make-
up some of those deficiencies. 
 Local anti-or slow-growth sentiments are mollified (Stein: 117, 1988). 
Arthur C. Nelson indicates that impact fees are the latest step in the evolution of 
financing public infrastructure.  As late as the 1920s governments readily extended public 
infrastructure to support new developments in an effort to promote economic growth.  
This infrastructure even included on-site infrastructure.  By the 1940s local governments 
were using exactions to establish public parks and infrastructure.  The primary reason for 
this change was the inability of the government to continue to support the high costs of 
infrastructure (Stein: 117-118, 1988).  This change continued in California through a 
referendum that was placed on the ballot and approved on June 6, 1978, although this 
time, the citizenry spearheaded the change.  This referendum was sponsored by Howard 
Jarvis and is known as Proposition 13 (Richter: 70, 1984).  The passage of Proposition 13 
substantially, and forever, changed the way governments financed public infrastructure, 
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especially schools.  The approval of Proposition 13 in California reduced the property tax 
base by $7 billion dollars the year it went into effect that resulted in a 57 percent decline 
in the property tax base (Kaufman & Rosen: 44, 1981). 
A similar property tax measure was placed on the Massachusetts ballot, 
Proposition 2½, which was passed in November 1980, (O’Sullivan, Sexton, Sheffrin: 1, 
1995).  In California the property tax was rolled back to 1975, the base year, and limited 
to a maximum increase of one percent per year (O’Sullivan, Sexton, Sheffrin: 12, 1995). 
In Massachusetts, however, property taxes rebounded due to reassessments that were not 
limited to a one percent per year increase regardless of the increase in property valuation 
(O’Sullivan, Sexton, Sheffrin: 96, 1995). 
With the loss of a substantial portion of the revenue generated by the property tax, 
state and local governments needed to find alternative methods to finance public 
infrastructure.  Local governments began to supplement fees to partially offset the losses 
in property tax revenues (O’Sullivan, Sexton, Sheffrin: 13, 1995).  Providing public 
infrastructure was originally thought of as the responsibility of government; this view 
changed when the Supreme Court sided with the Town of Ramapo in Golden v. The 
Planning Board of the Town of Ramapo.  Again, the Supreme Court sided with the City 
of Petaluma, California in a case brought forth by the Construction Industry Association 
of Sonoma County, California v. the City of Petaluma, California (Porter: 31-32, 1997).  
In siding with Ramapo and Petaluma, the Supreme Court ruled that communities could 
limit growth based on the public’s ability to develop the public infrastructure.  Therefore, 
a developer that wanted to develop property beyond the extent of the existing public 
 7 
infrastructure would be required to extend the infrastructure to the proposed 
development. 
Along with the property tax revolts of the 1970s, Ramapo and Petaluma began to 
shift the burden of financing new infrastructure on the developer (Snyder & Stegman: 6, 
1986).  The reduction in federal monies derived from intergovernmental aid and the 
elimination of categorical grants to state and local governments during the Reagan 
Administration (Gordon & Milakovich: 102, 1995) continued the trend of shifting the 
burden of financing public infrastructure to the developer. 
This brings us to the question of what constitutes development impact fees and 
exactions.  A development impact fee is a fee imposed by a government on a developer to 
cover the projected costs his project will have on the public facilities.  A development 
exaction is the dedication of land and/or infrastructure as a condition of approval to 
develop.  In imposing development impact fees and exactions, a rational nexus must be 
established between the fees imposed and the impact of a development on the existing 
infrastructure.  A rational nexus can be defined as a reasonable relationship between the 
fees imposed on a development and the impact that development has on the existing 
infrastructure. 
PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY: 
The primary question sought in this paper, one not covered by Frank and Rhodes, 
is the public’s perception of how public infrastructure should be financed through the use 
of impact fees and exactions or the property tax.  The goal of this paper will be to 
determine the public’s perception on the use of development impact fees and exactions to 
finance public infrastructure by developing and conducting a survey aimed at eliciting 
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responses from survey subjects in Ward Two of the City of Las Vegas, Nevada.  This 
study will also use a survey developed by Frank to determine what types of development 
impact fees and exactions are being used the by City of Las Vegas (Frank: 61-64, 1989). 
To date, the research associated with development impact fees and exactions has 
been limited to surveying which governments impose them, how to implement them, and 
the legality of their use.  Additionally, there is a growing need in Southern Nevada to 
manage growth and find alternative methods of financing public infrastructure. 
There have been two tax increases associated with the financing of public 
infrastructure in Clark County that have been at odds with the anti-tax sentiment 
associated with Proposition 13 in California, and Proposition 2½ in Massachusetts.  The 
tax increases were the approval of the ¼ cent sales tax increase to support the Southern 
Nevada Water Authority’s water line upgrades, and the continuation of the increased 
property tax to support general obligation bonds for school infrastructure. 
One of the most difficult problems associated with the use of development impact 
fees and exactions in Clark County is the limited flexibility the State of Nevada provides 
for their use.  In order for a local government to impose an impact fee, the Nevada 
Revised Statutes (NRS) require the local government to have a capital improvements plan 
in place. The Nevada Revised Statutes define capital improvements as a drainage project, 
a sanitary sewer project, a storm sewer project, a street project, or a water project.  
However, the NRS definition of capital improvements creates a unique hardship for local 
governments because schools are not included in this definition.  This omission results in 
the Clark County School District obtaining its primary financing through property taxes.  
The Clark County School District is expanding beyond its ability to finance the 
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expansion of its infrastructure without increasing property taxes.  By excluding schools 
from the definition of capital improvements, a general obligation bond due to be retired 
in the year 2000 had to be extended for an additional ten years.  Voters approved this 
extension to pay for needed school infrastructure. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS: 
 This study will seek to answer several research questions.  The questions this 
study will answer are: 
1. What development impact fees does the City of Las Vegas impose on development? 
2. Do the citizens within Ward Two of the City of Las Vegas support the use of 
development impact fees and exactions to support the financing of public 
infrastructure?  See Appendix “H” on page 91 for a map delineating the boundaries of 
Ward Two of the City of Las Vegas.  
3. Do the citizens within Ward Two of the City of Las Vegas support the use of the 
property tax to support the financing of public infrastructure? 
4. Are the independent variables of household income, education level, political party 
affiliation, and homeownership predictive of whether the respondents in the survey 
would: (1) support the use of impact fees, (2) support the use of impact fees if their 
use increased housing costs, (3) support the use of property taxes for new 
infrastructure, (4) support higher property taxes for new infrastructure, (5) vote for 
the school bond, (6) vote for the sales tax increase, (7) favor developers or new 
homeowners paying for new infrastructure. 
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SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS STUDY: 
 This study is significant in furthering the research of development impact fees and 
exactions because there have been no public opinion studies on the use of development 
impact fees and exactions.  Not only will this study use existing sampling methods to 
survey the City of Las Vegas on what development impact fees and exactions the City of 
Las Vegas uses, but this study will develop new a methodology that can be used by 
governments and researchers for assessing public opinion on the use of development 
impact fees and exactions.  Moreover, this study will identify the direction in which 
Southern Nevada residents want local governments to turn when financing new public 
infrastructure. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW: 
 In chapter one the significance of this study was discussed which brings 
up several questions.  Why do we need to study development impact fees and exactions?  
Frank and Rhodes (1-2, 1987) provide four reasons for studying development impact fees 
and exactions. 
 They indicate that very little systematic research has been conducted in this area. 
This, however, has changed since the publication of Development Exaction (1987). 
 Exactions of one type or another are now used by thousands of cities and counties 
across the United States, and it is clear that under appropriate circumstances exactions 
can have a significant impact on both the local government’s budget as well as the 
land development process. 
Frank and Rhodes also maintain little is known about the effect development fees 
and exactions have on development costs. 
 Another reason (Frank and Rhodes: 1-2, 1987) establish as a basis for studying 
development impact fees and exactions relates to the political climate that occurs 
when a government imposes development impact fees and exactions. 
Snyder & Stegman (96, 1986) assert that a Colorado Springs developer paid 
$6,170 in development fees which he marked up 28 percent to cover all of the 
developer’s associated costs.  Snyder & Stegman further state that while the development 
fees accounted for 8.2 percent of the sales price; when fully marked up, the fees 
accounted for 10.5 percent of the sales price. 
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This information, however, is disputed by (Freilich & Bushek, 1995).  An article 
written by Arthur C. Nelson for Freilich & Bushek corrects seven myths associated with 
impact fees.  The first myth Nelson rectifies is the notion that the impact fees will be 
passed on to homebuyers.  Nelson does this by looking at two market factors associated 
with home sales: competitive markets and noncompetitive markets.  In a competitive 
market, like Las Vegas, housing prices are kept in check by what the market will bear 
within all segments of the housing market.  Nelson contends that in a competitive market 
it is difficult for a developer to pass on the cost of impact fees.  Nelson further states that 
impact fees are viewed as a form of tax, which is internalized in keeping with classic 
economic theory of supply and demand.  Because there isn’t as much market demand for 
new housing in noncompetitive markets, Nelson does conclude that housing prices would 
increase.  This type of market condition, according to Nelson, is common in affluent 
mountain communities like Aspen, Vail, and Beaver Creek (Freilich & Bushek, 1995). 
Nelson disputes the notion that impact fees are bad for low-income and moderate-
income housing.  Low-income and moderate-income housing costs wouldn’t increase 
unless the cost of undeveloped land was nearly zero.  Nelson argues that impact fees 
actually do more to facilitate the production of this type of housing than inhibit it because 
the infrastructure created through the use of impact fees actually increases the supply of 
available land to develop.  Another argument Nelson shows to support his position is 
supply and demand.  If supply exceeds demand, prices will be lower than in a situation in 
which demand exceeds supply (Freilich & Bushek, 1995). 
The third myth Nelson supplants is the notion that impact fees have a border 
effect on parcels within a jurisdiction that utilizes impact fees as opposed to a 
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neighboring jurisdiction that doesn’t impose impact fees.  Here, Nelson contends that the 
property owner must sell the land to a developer at a lower cost in order to compete with 
the neighboring jurisdiction (Freilich & Bushek, 1995). 
Impact fees are bad for economic development is the fourth myth that Nelson 
corrects.  Nelson does this by asserting impact fees will be offset by reduced land prices.  
Additionally, Nelson contends that economic development needs skilled labor, access to 
markets, and land with adequate infrastructure. 
Impact fees are too high is the fifth myth that Nelson dispels.  Nelson is able to do 
this by presenting three arguments. 
(1) Impact fees merely reflect the real cost of providing the very infrastructure to 
new development that development needs.  (2) Impact fees rarely exceed one quarter of 
the total cost of new facilities needed to accommodate new development; the larger share 
of that cost is paid from intergovernmental sources and existing tax structures.  (3) 
Impact fees (other than utility connection fees) usually run less than five percent of the 
total sales price of a new home, which is less than the customary seven percent charged 
by real estate professionals (Freilich & Bushek, 1995). 
In the sixth myth, it is thought that impact fees are difficult and costly to 
administer.  Nelson purports that administration of impact fees account for one to five 
percent of the total receipts.  In fact, Nelson cites a Georgia Institute of Technology study 
that found negotiated development exactions is four times more costly to administer than 
impact fees (Freilich & Bushek, 1995). 
The notion that impact fees are just one more bureaucracy developers have to 
contend with is the final myth that Nelson dispels.  Because impact fees are based on a 
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published fee schedule, impact fees are predictable and are less likely to be based on an 
unfair negotiation process that could be arbitrary and capricious.  Unlike development 
exactions, impact fees are not negotiated; they are based on a rational nexus test. 
Nelson does offer six limitations of impact fees and how next generation impact 
fees solve the limitations of their predecessors.  When impact fees were first 
implemented, they were done so without notice to the development community and they 
were applied to standing inventory.  This situation was corrected by providing advance 
notice to developers that impact fees would be implemented and would be phased in over 
a period of time.  This phasing allows the developer to account for their effect on the 
developer’s financial situation (Freilich & Bushek, 1995). 
Nelson contends the second limitation associated with impact fees is that they 
tend to be regressive.  Because impact fees are assessed on a per person basis, (a 
requirement of the rational nexus test) lower cost homes have a higher percentage of their 
cost attributed to impact fees than higher cost homes.  The next generation impact fees 
will counter the regressive nature of impact fees by being based on home size, which is 
reflective of income (Freilich & Bushek, 1995). 
Nelson identifies a negative land value effect as the third limitation of impact 
fees.  The negative land value effect is associated with what the market will bear.  Nelson 
suggests that landowners may not be willing to develop their property because the cost of 
the impact fees will be internalized.  Nelson coins this internalization of land the 
“reservation price problem.”  The solution that Nelson offers for this situation is to waive 
impact fees for low-income housing and possibly for moderate-income housing.  Again, 
Nelson suggests basing impact fees on the size of the home.  Additionally, enterprise 
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zones with dedicated accounts would pay for the impact fee costs in low-income areas.  
Nelson offers the following as a final solution to the “reservation price problem:” He 
states: “Multiple service areas may be devised to account for special circumstances 
affecting community development patterns and development policy” (Freilich & Bushek, 
1995).  By this, Nelson is suggesting that new development in areas with adequate 
facilities or additional revenues in an account targeted for a low-income area would be 
relieved from paying impact fees. 
A fourth limitation Nelson provides on impact fees is that of low-income areas 
subsidizing higher income areas.  Here, Nelson states: “Impact fees tend to be assessed 
across large areas without sensitivity to the variability in the cost of providing service to 
particular areas or in particular development configurations” (Freilich & Bushek, 1995).  
This results in lower income sub-areas with higher densities paying proportionately more 
than higher income sub-areas.  The inequitable cost to lower income areas reinforces the 
perception of impact fees because they are similar to a flat tax, which is considered to be 
regressive in nature.  Again Nelson falls back on his argument for combating the third 
limitation of impact fees, in which fees are based on house size, and providing an 
alternative means of financing low-income housing.  Additionally, Nelson also states: 
“Being proactive in separating areas of substantially low cost from areas of substantially 
high cost but keeping the number of service areas small,” such as a tiered system 
(Freilich & Bushek, 1995).  Two cities offer such a system, San Diego, California, which 
uses a three-tier system and Columbus, Georgia, which has a two-tier system (Freilich & 
Bushek, 1995). 
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Nelson identifies high cost services everywhere as the fifth limitation of impact 
fees.  In this area Nelson looks at the costs of park development and road service levels.  
The cost of park development is considerably higher in some areas than in other areas.  
With respect to level of service (LOS) for roads, suburban areas may be willing to pay for 
a higher LOS than an inner city area.  The next generation of impact fees, Nelson 
purports will be based on the LOS that people living within an area are willing to pay for 
(Freilich & Bushek, 1995). 
The sixth and final limitation associated with impact fees according to Nelson 
concerns local officials and existing service level deficiencies.  In this situation, impact 
fees cannot be used to finance improvements and expansion of the existing infrastructure.  
Nelson indicates this is most common among road systems.  The next generation impact 
fees, however, will be more broad based to ensure that the system as a whole is operating 
at, above, or below desired levels.  Nelson suggests that planning policy can direct new 
development away from the over burdened infrastructure (Freilich & Bushek, 1995). 
Understanding the changing nature of the players involved in the development 
process is the fourth, and final reason for which Frank and Rhodes (1-2, 1987) predicated 
a need for studying development fees and exactions.  Prior to the establishment of impact 
fees and exactions, the developer determined the direction of development, and public 
sector governments followed the developer with the necessary infrastructure Frank and 
Rhodes (1-2, 1987). 
Altshuler and Gómez-Ibáñez (78, 1993) profess the cost/revenue analysis studies 
of the 1940s and 1950s for residential developments and the fiscal impact analysis studies 
of the 1970s that included commercial and industrial developments occasioned a 
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conventional wisdom that stated housing for low- and moderate-income families didn’t 
pay for themselves with respect to infrastructure.  The conventional wisdom of the time, 
however, believed most other forms of development would pay for themselves.   
The notion that commercial, industrial, and high-income residential development 
paid for themselves came about by the assumption that these types of development 
required fewer public services while providing high tax revenues.  Low- and moderate-
income residential developments, on the other hand, were thought to place a heavy 
burden on public services while contributing proportionally insignificant revenues to 
local governments.  Due to reduced federal aid for infrastructure and federal government- 
imposed environmental restrictions, commercial, industrial, and high-income residential 
development was no longer viewed as a high revenue producer and low service user.  
Another complication at work during the 1970s and 1980s was the property tax revolt, 
which exacerbated revenue deficiencies experienced by local government. 
O’Sullivan, Sexton, and Shefferin (71, 1995) indicate the ad valorem property tax 
(property tax based on market value) is progressive in nature.  This is true because land 
and capital are concentrated among people with higher incomes. O’Sullivan, Sexton, and 
Shefferin purport that increased property taxes will, in part, be offset by consumers 
paying rent; but because land is immobile, the brunt of the property tax will be absorbed 
by the property owner.  With respect to an acquisition-value-based property tax, 
O’Sullivan, Sexton, and Shefferin state this type of property tax decreases household 
mobility and will increase the likelihood of homeownership for infrequent movers, while 
decreasing the likelihood of homeownership for frequent movers. 
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Schwadron and Richter (159-163, 1984) show the effects of Proposition 13 on 
parks.  Humboldt County, in Northwestern California, was unable to support the 
$205,000 annual budget for its park system.  Approximately $40,000 of this budget was 
used for park maintenance.  Schwadron and Richter declare that Humboldt County was 
unable to continue to maintain several parks due to the passage of Proposition 13.  This 
lack of funding resulted in the parks being transferred to a community park service 
district, the National Park Service, and the Bureau of Land Management.    Other 
examples of reductions in park services provided by Schwadron and Richter include the 
City of Los Angeles, which closed 24 small community centers and an increase in user 
fees in the San Francisco Bay area.  Additionally, Schwadron and Richter state 41 percent 
of the parks statewide either eliminated facilities or reduced hours of operation. 
Webb & Hatry (17-27, 1973) provide seven uses for surveys in government.  The 
following is a list of these uses:  
1. Provide citizen perceptions of the effectiveness of public services including the 
identification of problem areas. 
2. Provide selected factual data. 
3. Help identify reasons for dislike or non-use of services. 
4. Pretests of citizen demand for new services. 
5. Citizen opinion surveys. 
6. Provide data on citizen awareness of local government programs. 
7. Provide a means for increasing citizen participation in government planning and 
policy foundation, and reduce isolation or alienation from their government. 
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The survey used in this study will be useful in determining the following perceptions 
discussed by Webb & Hatry: 
1. Provide factual data from constituents within Ward Two of the City of Las Vegas. 
2. Identify like or dislike of development impact fees and exactions. 
3. Elicit citizen opinions. 
4. Provide awareness on the use of the property tax to finance public infrastructure. 
Miller and Miller (7-8, 1991) indicate that citizen surveys change public 
perception by focusing the survey on particular segments of the population.  Additionally, 
citizen surveys provide opinions that are central to the policy question.  Moreover, citizen 
surveys give a voice to all segments of the population, including those people who might 
not otherwise become involved. 
According to Miller and Miller (75, 1991) there are three general principles when 
constructing a citizen questionnaire.  These principles are clarity, simplicity, and fairness.  
To achieve clarity, a survey should not include vague phrasing of questions, double-
barreled questions, false assumptions, and overlapping categories.  “Simplicity can be 
achieved through specificity, brevity, logic, and security” (Miller and Miller 1991, p. 71).  
Finally, a survey is considered fair when the survey avoids option bias, promotes option 
completeness, balances option order, and considers question context. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY: 
 Two methodological approaches will be used in this paper.  The first 
methodology used in this thesis will be taken from (Frank: 61-64, 1989).  The 
methodology used by Frank is a survey of government jurisdiction’s use of impact fees 
and exactions.  The survey will be administered to The City of Las Vegas Planning 
Department to determine which impact fees and exactions are utilized because impact 
fees and exactions are typically imposed upon issuance of a building permit or land-use 
application approval process.  Because the survey will involve an entire population, and 
the survey will ask questions specifically related to what impact fees and exactions are 
used by the City of Las Vegas, there will be no sampling bias. 
Because no public opinion surveys have been conducted on the use of 
development impact fees and exactions, a new methodological approach will be 
developed to measure public opinion on the use of development impact fees and 
exactions as the second methodological approach in this paper.  This methodology will be 
used to support the thesis that citizens within Ward Two of the City of Las Vegas are 
more likely to support development impact fees and exactions as opposed to the use of 
the property tax as a means of supporting the expansion of public infrastructure.  For 
guidance in developing a public opinion survey, two examples will be used from the 
Urban Land Institute’s publications on the development of public opinion sampling 
(Webb & Hatry: 1973) (Weiss & Hatry: 1971). 
 The public opinion survey will involve 101 residents living within Ward Two of 
the City of Las Vegas.  Due to the extensive cost of mail and telephone surveys, this 
 21 
survey will be conducted in person at the Summerlin Trails Village Center and will 
survey residents living within the Summerlin area of Ward Two.  Chi-square cross 
tabulations will be used to measure the relationships between the independent variables 
and dependent variables.  A sample of 101 people will be used to allow for a normal 
distribution. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH ANALYSIS: 
The first of the two surveys to be analyzed in the paper will be a survey modified 
from Frank (1989).  This survey is a comprehensive examination of the use of 
development impact fees and exactions used within the City of Las Vegas, Nevada.  The 
survey identifies nine infrastructure and environmental areas where the City of Las Vegas 
would logically use impact fees to support new public infrastructure or negotiates 
exactions to mitigate the environmental impacts caused by development.  The nine areas 
identified are: water, sewer, fire/EMS, police, schools, roads, desert tortoise, and other 
fees.  Each of the aforementioned impact fee areas was paired with a list of 12 questions.  
The City of Las Vegas uses development impact fees and exactions for sewer 
connections, parks, roads, and to mitigate environmental degradation of the desert 
tortoise habitat.  The impact fees are assessed at the issuance of a building permit, and 
credits are made for other developer contributions.  The impact fee ordinance allows for 
recalculation of the fees based on an index, and the fees are accounted for by type, e.g. 
sewer, park, etc. 
The City of Las Vegas expends its impact fee revenues by building new facilities 
for new development.  The city has used impact fees for more than 35 years for sewer 
connections, 12 years for desert tortoise mitigation, 11 years for park development and 
maintenance, and nine years for transportation purposes.  The city provides no allowance 
of fee deferment by securing a lien on the property. Fees for sewer connections within the 
City of Las Vegas are $1200 per unit.  The desert tortoise fee is calculated by acreage, 
which is set at $550 per acre.  Park and transportation impact fees within the City of Las 
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Vegas are calculated at $0.36 per square foot and $500 per unit respectively.  To date, no 
court actions have taken place within the City of Las Vegas with respect to the levying 
impact fees, and the fees aren’t used to secure bond issues for financing capital 
improvements.  Finally, fees can be waived through City Council approval for 
affordable/low-income housing projects.  (For a complete list of the impact fees levied 
and the questions asked see Appendix A, Page 43). 
  The second area of analysis reviewed in this paper is the statistical data obtained 
in a public opinion survey.  Appendices “B” through “F” (Page 44-89) provide a 
graphical representation about the distribution of the data. The first data analyzed will be 
related to the descriptive statistics for each of the 15 questions asked in the survey.  
Finally, a Chi-square analysis of the independent and dependent variables will be 
analyzed to identify if any significant relationships exist between the independent and 
dependent variables. 
In an effort to determine public opinion on the use of development impact fees 
and exactions, a survey tool of fifteen questions has been developed.  The questions are 
based on a five-level Likert scale for ordinal data with a few yes/no questions used for 
nominal data.  The data was collapsed to a two-level or three-level Likert scale in order to 
minimize errors due to the sample size.  The data was analyzed using the student version 
of SPSS 9.0 software to analyze a T-test and Chi squared cross tabulations. 
Using a statistical calculator, called a webulator, developed by William J. 
Montelpare to calculate sample sizes, a sample size of 101 people was calculated.  The 
sample size was calculated using a z-score of 1.72, an expected proportion of 0.5, a 
population of 80,554, and an 8.54 percent error rate.  The sample size can be calculated 
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by using the following formula: n = (Z * σ E)2 where “n” is the sample size, Z is the Z-
score, “σ sigma” is the standard deviation for a population, and E is the percentage error.  
The population was based on the City of Las Vegas Planning Department’s information 
of Ward Two’s population being 77,905 people as of July 1, 1999, and a growth rate of 
6.8 percent to obtain an 8.54 percent error.  Accounting for six months’ additional growth 
at 6.8 percent, the population of Ward Two is 80,554.  While no statistics were kept on 
gender, approximately 75 percent of the respondents were women, and the response rate 
was approximately 60 percent.  
The following data represents the raw statistical data prior to collapsing the data 
in the Chi-square contingency table analysis.  Approximately sixty percent of the people 
surveyed strongly agree impact fees and exactions should be used to support new 
infrastructure such as schools, parks, drainage basins, and traffic mitigation.  However, 
only 50.5 percent of the people surveyed would support the use of impact fees and 
exactions if their use increased the cost of housing, a slightly higher percentage than 
those opposing the use of development impact fees and exactions if their use increased 
housing costs. 
More than seventy-six percent of the responses strongly agree or agree that 
existing property taxes should be used to support new infrastructure such as schools, 
parks, drainage basins, and traffic mitigation.  While the people surveyed are willing to 
have existing property taxes support new infrastructure, 63.4 percent of the people 
surveyed are opposed to increasing property taxes to support new infrastructure, which is 
consistent with the anti-tax sentiment that Richter (1984) describes. 
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More than 40 percent of the of the respondents believe the quality of and 
availability of school facilities in the Clark County School District compared to schools 
outside of Clark County are worse than average. 
Greater than 76 percent of the people surveyed believe that the amount of 
parkland within the Las Vegas Valley is better than average, or average.   
Only 24.8 percent of the respondents indicate that they believe drainage facilities 
used to control flooding in the Las Vegas Valley are better than average compared to 44.6 
percent who believe that drainage facilities were worse than average or much worse than 
average. 
Almost 42 percent of the people surveyed agree that new infrastructure should be 
paid for by the developer.  Surprisingly, 50.5 percent of the respondents believe that 
everybody should pay for new infrastructure. 
The majority of people surveyed, 31.7 percent didn’t vote and another 17.8 
percent didn’t live within Clark County to vote for the school bond or the ¼ cent sales tax 
increase for the Southern Nevada Water Authority’s Lake Mead water line expansion. Of 
those respondents who voted, almost 40 percent of the people surveyed voted in favor of 
continuing the general obligation bond to support the Clark County School District’s 
facility expansion, while only 10.9 percent voted in opposition of the school bond.  
Similarly, 29.7 percent supported the sales tax increase, while 20.8 percent voted in 
opposition to the sales tax increase. 
More than 63 percent of the people surveyed indicated they had a household 
income over $60,000, of which approximately 29 percent indicated their household 
income was over $100,000. 
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 A little more than 25 percent of the people are high school graduates, 50.5 percent 
are college graduates, and nearly 24 percent of the people have a graduate degree. 
Nearly 46 percent of the respondents indicate they are members of the Republican 
Party, 39.6 percent are members of the Democratic Party, and 14.9 percent state they are 
in a category listed as other.  
Of the people surveyed, 88.1 percent are homeowners, while 11.9 percent are not 
homeowners. 
A T-test was performed to calculate the descriptive statistics for fourteen of the 
questions in the survey.  In question number one, the mean in support of the use of 
impact fees is 1.6040 with a standard deviation of 0.4915, a score of two represents an 
answer of strongly agree.  The mean and standard deviation for question number two, 
asking whether property taxes should be used for new infrastructure, is 1.4158 and 
0.4953, a score of one represents an answer of agree/strongly disagree.  The third 
question, which dealt with the quality and availability of school facilities, has a mean of 
1.1980 with a standard deviation of 0.4005, a score of one represents an answer of 
average/worse than average.  A mean of 1.3366 and a standard deviation of 0.4749 
occurred for question four, which asks about the availability of parkland, a score of one 
represents an answer of average/worse than average.  The quality of drainage facilities, 
question five, had a mean of 1.2475 with a standard deviation of 0.4337, a score of one 
represents an answer of average/worse than average.  In the sixth question, who should 
pay for new infrastructure, the mean is 1.4752 and the standard deviation is 0.5019, a 
score of one represents an answer of everybody. 
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Two questions relating to voting on tax measures in 1998 (extending the school 
bond and the ¼ cent sales tax increase) were the seventh and eighth questions in the 
survey.  The mean for each question is 1.9010 and 1.8020 with a standard deviation of 
0.9435 and 0.8720 respectively, a score of two represents an answer of no in each 
question.  This is misleading because of the high number of people not voting or living in 
Las Vegas in 1998, which lowers the mean.  In fact, more people living in Las Vegas in 
1998 that were surveyed voted for both tax measures.  The ninth and tenth questions 
related to supporting higher property taxes or higher housing costs through the use 
development impact fees and exactions for new infrastructure.  Question nine, supporting 
higher property taxes for new infrastructure has a mean of 1.3663 and a standard 
deviation of 0.4842, a score of one represents an answer of no.  Question ten, supporting 
higher housing costs due to impact fees has a mean of 1.5050 and a standard deviation of 
0.5025, a score of one represents an answer of no.  In question eleven, the mean 
household income range was $68,118.81 with a standard deviation of $9870.45.  
Education level was the twelfth question in the survey, and the mean is 2.02 with a 
standard deviation of 0.71, a score of two represents an answer of having a college 
degree.  The thirteenth question asked about political party affiliation.  The mean for this 
category is 2.31 and the standard deviation is 0.72, a score of two represents a political 
party affiliation with the Democratic Party.  This is misleading because there were more 
Republican Party members than Democratic Party members surveyed.  The fourteenth 
and final question in the survey asked about homeownership, and has a mean of 1.88 and 
a standard deviation of 0.33, a score of two equates to being a homeowner. 
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It was theorized at the beginning of the survey, that there would be a significant 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables.  However, in analyzing 
the Chi-Square cross tabulations, some unexpected results appeared.  In the survey there 
were four independent variables: income range, education level, political party affiliation, 
and homeownership.  Seven dependent variables were identified in the survey. The 
dependent variables were: supporting the school bond, supporting the ¼ cent sales tax 
increase, who should pay for new infrastructure, supporting impact fees for new 
infrastructure, supporting impact fees if housing prices increased, supporting property 
taxes to fund new infrastructure, and supporting higher property taxes to fund new 
infrastructure.  Using SPSS 9.0, a significant relationship is said to exist when the 
asymptotic significance reaches a value of 0.05.  In the survey no asymptotic value was 
less than 0.082; therefore, an asymptotic value 0.10 is being used to show whether a 
relationship is approaching significance.  Additionally, with an error rate of 
approximately eight and one half percent, using an asymptotic significance of 0.10 would 
be more in line with the error rate used in the survey.  No significant relationship was 
identified between each of the independent and dependent variables in the Chi-square 
analysis.  A minor relationship may exist between the independent variable of income 
level and the dependent variable supporting impact fees if their use increased housing 
costs.  A few of the independent variables are approaching a relationship as indicated by 
asymptotic significance levels between 0.146 and 0.167.  Education level is approaching 
a relationship with supporting impact fees if their use increased housing costs.  Political 
party affiliation is also approaching a relationship with the dependent variable in voting 
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to support the school bond.  Finally, homeownership is approaching a relationship with 
voting to support both the school bond and the sales tax increase. 
In reviewing the independent variable household income level with each of the seven 
dependent variables the following results were observed, starting with household income. 
1. Should impact fees be used to support new infrastructure?  A Chi-square value of 
0.010 was observed with an asymptotic significance of 0.992.  Here, the null 
hypothesis that people with a household income less than $80,000 a year are as likely 
to support impact fees as people with a household income greater than $80,000 
cannot be rejected.  In this category, 60 percent of the people with a household 
income below $80,000 a year strongly agree that impact fees should be used to 
support new infrastructure.  This is not significantly different than the 61 percent of 
the people with a household income greater than $80,000 strongly agreeing that 
impact fees should be used to support new infrastructure. 
2. Would you support the use of impact fees if their use increased the cost of housing?  
The Chi-square value observed between the independent variable and dependent 
variable is 3.033, and the asymptotic significance is 0.082.  The null hypothesis that 
people with a household income less than $80,000 a year are as likely to support 
impact fees if their use increased housing costs as people with a household income 
greater than $80,000 can be rejected at the 0.10 level. There is a significant difference 
between the 61 percent of the people with a household income greater than $80,000 
per year, and the 43.3 percent with a household income below $80,000 per year 
supporting the use of impact fees if their use increased housing costs. 
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3. Should property taxes be used to support new infrastructure?  There was a Chi-square 
value of 0.153, and an asymptotic significance of 0.696 observed between these 
variables.  The null hypothesis that people with a household income below $80,000 a 
year are just as likely as people with a household income greater than $80,000 a year 
to support using property taxes to fund new infrastructure cannot be rejected.  In this 
case, 40 percent of the people with a household income below $80,000 a year 
compared to 43.9 percent of the people with a household income greater than $80,000 
a year supported the use of property taxes being used to fund new infrastructure. 
4. Would you support higher property taxes to support new infrastructure?  The Chi-
square value between the independent variable and the dependent variable is 0.000, 
and the asymptotic significance is 0.993.  It can be no more clear that the null 
hypothesis that people with a household income less than $80,000 a year are equally 
as likely as people with a household income greater than $80,000 a year to support 
higher property taxes to fund new infrastructure cannot be rejected.  The difference 
between people with a household income below $80,000 a year and people with a 
household income greater than $80,000 a year was 0.01 percent. 
5. Did you vote for the school bond?  A Chi-square value of 3.210 and an asymptotic 
significance of 0.201 were observed.  Again, the null hypothesis that people with a 
household income below $80,000 a year are as likely as people with a household 
income greater than $80,000 a year to vote for the school bond cannot be rejected.  A 
greater percentage of people in the household income level greater than $80,000 a 
year voted to support the school bond.  However a greater percentage of people in the 
same income level voted against the school bond.  This occurred because there were 
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more people that either didn’t vote or didn’t live in Clark County during the last 
election. 
6. Did you vote for the sales tax increase?  Not surprisingly, the null hypothesis that 
people with a household income less than $80,000 a year are just as likely as people 
with a household income greater than $80,000 a year to vote for the sales tax increase 
cannot be rejected.  Here, the Chi-square value is 3.062, and the asymptotic 
significance is 0.216.  A similar occurrence appeared in this category as the school 
bond category where a greater percentage of people with a household income greater 
than $80,000 a year voted to support increasing the sales tax.  A greater percentage of 
people within the same income level also voted against increasing the sales tax.  
Again, this can be attributed more to people not voting or not living within Clark 
County during the last election. 
7. Who should pay for new infrastructure?  This category, not unlike five of the other 
categories, shows similar results with respect to the null hypothesis.  The null 
hypothesis that people with a household income less than $80,000 a year are equally 
as likely as people with a household income greater than $80,000 a year to favor the 
developer and new residents paying for new infrastructure.  A Chi-square value of 
0.378 and an asymptotic significance of 0.539 were observed.  Forty-five percent of 
the people with a household income less than $80,000 and 51.2 percent of the people 
with a household income greater than $80,000 a year favored the developer and new 
residents to pay for new infrastructure. 
The following results occurred between the second independent variable, education 
level, and each of the seven dependent variables. 
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1. Should impact fees be used to support new infrastructure?  This category resulted in a 
Chi-square value of 1.687 and the asymptotic significance is 0.430.  Therefore, the 
null hypothesis that people with less education are as likely as people with a college 
or graduate school education to support the use of impact fees to fund new 
infrastructure cannot be rejected.  People with a graduate school education (66.7 
percent), college education (62.7 percent), and high school education (50 percent) 
strongly agree that impact fees should be used to fund new infrastructure. 
2. Would you support the use of impact fees if their use increased the cost of housing?  
The Chi-square value of 3.579 and asymptotic significance level of 0.167 between 
these variables is approaching significance.  However, an asymptotic significance 
level of 0.10 has been used which is more in line with the error rate determined to be 
acceptable for this study.  Because the asymptotic significance did not reach 0.10, the 
null hypothesis that people with less education are equally as likely as people with a 
college or graduate school education to support impact fees if their use increased 
housing costs cannot be rejected.  This is surprising because 65.4 percent of the 
people surveyed with a high school education would not support impact fees if they 
increased the cost of housing compared to 43.1 percent of the people with a college 
education, and 45.8 percent of the people with a graduate school education. 
3. Should property taxes be used to support new infrastructure?  The null hypothesis that 
people with less education are just as likely as people with a college or graduate 
school education to support the use of property taxes to fund new infrastructure 
cannot be rejected.  The reason the null hypothesis cannot be rejected is because the 
asymptotic significance value of 0.367, which relates to the Chi-square value of 
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2.002, has not reached the necessary significance value of 0.10.  Only 30.8 percent of 
the people surveyed with a high school education, 43.1 percent of the people with a 
college education, and 50 percent of the people with a graduate school education 
strongly agree that property taxes should be used to fund new infrastructure. 
4. Would you support higher property taxes to support new infrastructure?  The Chi-
square value of 0.513 and the asymptotic significance value of 0.774, again prevent 
rejecting the null hypothesis that people with less education are as likely as people 
with a college or graduate school education to support the use of higher property 
taxes to fund new infrastructure.  More than 66 percent of people surveyed with a 
graduate school education, 64.7 percent of people with a college education, and 57.7 
people with a high school education would not support higher property taxes to fund 
new infrastructure. 
5. Did you vote for the school bond?  In comparing these variables, a Chi-square value 
of 2.159 and an asymptotic significance of 0.707 were observed.  Similar to the other 
dependent variables in this category, the null hypothesis that people with less 
education are just as likely as people with a college or graduate school education to 
have voted in favor of the school bond cannot be rejected.  Fifty percent of the people 
surveyed with a graduate school education, 35.3 percent of the a college education, 
and 38.5 percent of the people with a high school education voted in favor of the 
school bond.  While these percentages are less than or equal to 50 percent, almost 50 
percent of the people surveyed didn’t vote or didn’t live in Clark County during the 
last election. 
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6. Did you vote for the sales tax increase?  The results in this category parallel the 
results of the previous categories in that the Chi-square value of 0.975 and the 
asymptotic significance value of 0.914.  Because the asymptotic significance is not 
0.10 or less, the null hypothesis that people with less education are equally as likely 
as people with a college or graduate school education to have voted in favor of the 
sales tax increase cannot be rejected.  Almost 30 percent of the people surveyed with 
a graduate school education, 27.5 percent of the a college education, and 29.2 percent 
of the people with a high school education voted in favor of the sales tax increase.  
Not unlike the previous question, these percentages are less than 50 percent, but 
almost 50 percent of the people surveyed didn’t vote or didn’t live in Clark County 
during the last election.  It should be noted that collapsing the data to include both not 
voting and not living in Clark County during the last election accounts for the 
discrepancy in the count between this question and the previous question in the Chi-
square contingency tables.  Some of the respondents voted for the school bond while 
not voting for the sales tax and visa-versa. 
7. Who should pay for new infrastructure?  Finally, the question asking who should pay 
for new infrastructure is compared with education level.  Again, the results of this 
category prevent rejecting the null hypothesis that people with less education are just 
as likely as people with a college or graduate school education to agree that 
developers and new residents should pay for new infrastructure.  Here, the Chi-square 
value is 1.538 and the asymptotic significance is 0.464.  In this category, quite 
surprisingly, the majority of people surveyed, 41.7 percent with a graduate school 
education, 56.9 percent of the people with a college education, and 53.8 percent of the 
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people with a high school education stated that everybody should pay for new 
infrastructure. 
The next independent variable studied in the survey was political party affiliation. 
The following results were observed with each of the seven dependent variables. 
1. Should impact fees be used to support new infrastructure?  We cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that a member of the Democratic Party is equally as likely as a member of 
the Republican Party or another political party to support the use of impact fees to 
fund new infrastructure.  The reason we cannot reject the null hypothesis is because 
the asymptotic significance value of 0.871 related to the Chi-square value of 0.276 
means there is an 87.1 percent chance of incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis.  
Sixty-three percent of the Republicans surveyed, 57.5 percent of Democrats, and 60 
percent of the members classified in another political party strongly agree that impact 
fees should be used to fund new infrastructure. 
2. Would you support the use of impact fees if their use increased the cost of housing?  
When asked this question, 52.2 percent of the Republicans surveyed, 47.5 percent of 
Democrats, and 53.3 percent of the members classified in another political party 
supported the use of impact fees if their use increased housing costs.  The Chi-square 
value in this case is 0.244 and the asymptotic significance is 0.885.  Therefore, the 
null hypothesis that a member of the Democratic Party is equally as likely as a 
member of the Republican Party or another political party to support impact fees if 
their use increased the cost of housing cannot be rejected. 
3. Should property taxes be used to support new infrastructure?  In this category, only 
39.1 percent of the Republicans surveyed, 40 percent of the Democrats, and 53.3 
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percent of the members of another political party strongly agree that property taxes 
should be used to fund new infrastructure.  A Chi-square value of 1.008 and an 
asymptotic significance of 0.604 were observed in this category.  Therefore, there 
would be a 60.4 percent chance of incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis that a 
member of the Republican Party is just as likely as a member of the Democratic Party 
or another political party to support the use of property taxes to fund new 
infrastructure. 
4. Would you support higher property taxes to support new infrastructure?  Once again, 
the Chi-square value of 2.576 and the asymptotic significance of 0.276 prevent 
rejecting the null hypothesis that a member of the Republican Party is as likely as a 
member of the Democratic Party or another political party to support higher property 
taxes to fund new infrastructure.  Nearly 70 percent of the Republicans surveyed, 62.5 
percent of the Democrats, and 46.7 percent of the members of another political party 
were opposed to increasing property taxes to fund new infrastructure. 
5. Did you vote for the school bond?  Looking at the results of this category, the Chi-
square value is 6.823, which relates to an asymptotic significance of 0.146.  While a 
significant relationship between the independent variable and independent variable is 
not observed in this case because the asymptotic significance is not 0.10 or less, the 
independent variable and dependent variable are approaching significance.  The null 
hypothesis that a member of the Republican Party is equally as likely as a member of 
the Democratic Party or another political party, however, still cannot be rejected.  
Fifty percent of the Republicans surveyed, 35 percent of the Democrats, and 20 
percent of the members of another political party voted if favor of the school bond. 
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6. Did you vote for the sales tax increase?  The null hypothesis that a member of the 
Republican Party is equally as likely as a member of the Democratic Party or another 
political party to vote in favor of the sales tax increase cannot be rejected in this 
category because the asymptotic significance is not 0.10 or less.  The Chi-square 
value for this question is 4.798 and the asymptotic significance is 0.309.  Thirty-seven 
percent of the Republicans surveyed, 27.5 percent of the Democrats, and 13.3 percent 
of the members of another political party voted in favor of the sales tax increase.  The 
reason that none of the political parties had a percentage over 37 percent is because 
almost 50 percent of the people surveyed didn’t vote or didn’t live in Clark County 
during the last election.  It should be noted that collapsing the data to include both not 
voting and not living in Clark County during the last election accounts for the 
discrepancy in the count between this question and the previous question in the Chi-
square contingency tables.  Some of the respondents voted for the school bond while 
not voting for the sales tax and visa-versa. 
7. Who should pay for new infrastructure?  The final dependent variable paired with 
political party affiliation, the null hypothesis that a member of the Democratic Party 
is equally as likely as a member of the Republican Party or another political party to 
agree that developers and new residents should pay for new infrastructure cannot be 
rejected.  In this case the Chi-square value is 0.703 and the asymptotic significance is 
0.703.  More than 56 percent of Republicans surveyed, 47.5 percent of Democrats, 
and 53.3 percent of the members of another political party indicated that everybody 
should pay for new infrastructure. 
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The fourth and final independent variable analyzed in the survey was 
homeownership.  In this case, the following results were witnessed between 
homeownership and each of the independent variables. 
1. Should impact fees be used to support new infrastructure?  The Chi-square value 
between these variables is 0.024 and the asymptotic significance is 0.876. The null 
hypothesis that non-homeowners are just as likely as homeowners to support the use 
of impact fees cannot be rejected.  Nearly 61 percent of the homeowners surveyed 
supported the use of impact fees, compared to 58.3 percent of non-homeowners. 
2. Would you support the use of impact fees if their use increased the cost of housing? . 
The null hypothesis that non-homeowners are as likely as homeowners to support the 
use of impact fees if their use increased the cost of housing cannot be rejected.  While 
52.8 percent of the homeowners surveyed supported the of impact fees if their use 
cost of housing increased, 66.7 percent of the non-homeowners surveyed did not 
support the use of impact fees if their use increased the cost of housing.  Although 
there appears to be a significant disparity between homeowners and non-
homeowners, the Chi-square value of 1.604 relates to an asymptotic significance of 
0.205, which prevents rejecting the null hypothesis.  
3. Should property taxes be used to support new infrastructure?  Almost an identical 
percentage of homeowners and non-homeowners, 41.6 percent to 41.7 percent 
respectively, strongly agree that property taxes should be used to support new 
infrastructure.  The expected and observed counts in the Chi-square cross tabulation 
were identical for each column and row.  This resulted in a Chi-square value of 0.000 
and an asymptotic significance of 0.995, which means the null hypothesis that non-
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homeowners are equally as likely as homeowners to support the use of property taxes 
to fund new infrastructure cannot be rejected.  In other words, if the null hypothesis 
was rejected, it would be rejected incorrectly 99.5 percent of the time. 
4. Would you support higher property taxes to support new infrastructure?  The results 
for this dependent variable are not significantly different from the previous dependent 
variable.  Here, the Chi-square value is 0.064 and the asymptotic significance is 
0.800.  Approximately 63 percent of the homeowners surveyed compared to 66.7 
percent of the non-homeowners would not support higher property taxes to fund new 
infrastructure.  Similarly, the null hypothesis that non-homeowners are as likely 
homeowners to reject increasing property taxes to fund new infrastructure cannot be 
rejected. 
5. Did you vote for the school bond?  Roughly 43 percent of the homeowners and 16.7 
percent of the non-homeowners voted in favor of the school bond.  A Chi-square 
value of 3.679 and an asymptotic significance of 0.159 were observed between these 
variables.  The independent and dependent variables are approaching significance. 
However, the null hypothesis that non-homeowners are as equally as likely as 
homeowners to vote in favor of the school bond cannot be rejected because the 
asymptotic significance did not reach the 0.10 threshold.  Because 49.5 percent of the 
people didn’t vote or didn’t live in Clark County during the last election, the majority 
of people that did vote is less than 50 percent. 
6. Did you vote for the sales tax increase?  The results in this grouping are not that 
different from the previous pairing.  The Chi-square value for these variables is 3.584 
and the asymptotic significance is 0.167.  Here too, the variables are approaching 
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significance, but are not able to show a relationship because the asymptotic 
significance is not 0.10 or less.  More than 31 percent of the homeowners surveyed 
and 16.7 percent of the non-homeowners voted in favor of the sales tax increase. 
Similar to the previous question, 49.5 percent of the people didn’t vote or didn’t live 
in Clark County during the last election, resulting in a majority of people that is less 
than 50 percent. 
7. Who should pay for new infrastructure?  The final variables surveyed also show no 
significant relationship.  The Chi-square value between the dependent and 
independent variable is 0.187 and the asymptotic significance is 0.665. The null 
hypothesis that non-homeowners are equally as likely as homeowners to agree that 
developers and new residents should pay for new infrastructure cannot be rejected.  
Nearly 52 percent of the homeowners and 58.3 percent of the non-homeowners 
indicated that everybody should pay for new infrastructure. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: 
 The study of development impact fees and exactions has gained a significant 
amount of academic attention since the 1980s.  Urban planning professors like James 
Frank, Arthur Nelson, etal. have contributed a significant body of scholarly research to 
the study of development impact fees and exactions.  However, these studies have been 
limited to surveying which governments impose development impact fees and exactions, 
how to implement them, and the legality of their use.  This study has helped to develop a 
new area within the study of development impact fees and exactions, that being public 
opinion on their use.  With intergovernmental grants in aid dwindling since 1980, local 
governments have been forced to identify new funding mechanisms to support public 
infrastructure.  Moreover, many states like Nevada have a taxpayer bill-of-rights, which 
requires the state and local governments to spend tax revenues responsibly.  The use of 
development impact fees and exactions has been an important method of funding public 
infrastructure in California since the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978 and will likely 
become an important method of funding public infrastructure in Southern Nevada in the 
future. 
 Surveying the impact fees used by the City of Las Vegas has identified four areas 
in which the city assesses impact fees.  The impact fees that the City of Las Vegas 
imposes to support public infrastructure are applied toward sewer connections, park 
development, road expansion and improvements, and desert tortoise habitat mitigation.  
Like all cities and counties within the State of Nevada, the City of Las Vegas cannot 
impose impact fees for school development.  Unfortunately, the public infrastructure 
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most impacted by growth in Southern Nevada is adequate school infrastructure, which 
has been augmented by taxpayers supporting an extension of a school bond.  This, 
however, is the type of property tax increase that spurred voters in California to approve 
Proposition 13 in 1978.  If the history of California is not going to be repeated in 
Southern Nevada, the City of Las Vegas, needs to be an instrumental participant in 
lobbying the Nevada State Legislature to allow impact fees to be imposed for public 
school infrastructure. 
One of the research questions outlined in this thesis was: Do the citizens within 
Ward Two of the City of Las Vegas support the use of development impact fees and 
exactions to support the financing of public infrastructure? 
 This study has identified that the majority of people surveyed within Ward Two 
of the City of Las Vegas are in favor of the use of development impact fees and 
exactions, but not at the expense of increased housing costs. 
Another question asked in this thesis was: Do the citizens within Ward Two of the 
City of Las Vegas support the use of the property tax to support the financing of public 
infrastructure? 
Not surprisingly, this thesis has shown that people are willing to use property 
taxes to support public infrastructure, unless property taxes have to be increased to 
support new infrastructure. 
A third question identified in this survey was: Are the independent variables 
predictive of the dependent variables? 
With the exception of the relationship between the independent variable, 
household income, and the dependent variable, would you support the use of impact fees 
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if their use increased housing costs, none of the other independent variables was 
predictive of the dependent variables, although there were four other 
independent/dependent variables that approached significance with asymptotic 
significance levels between 0.146 and 0.167. 
 It is interesting to find that residents within Ward Two perceive school facilities 
and drainage facilities as worse than average or much worse than average, yet they are 
unwilling to support either development impact fees and exactions or higher property 
taxes to fund public infrastructure.  Equally confusing is the fact that the majority of 
people surveyed living in Southern Nevada during the last election voted for the school 
bond and sales tax increase. 
An unexpected result in this study is the fact that constituents within Ward Two 
believe that the cost of financing public infrastructure should be absorbed by all segments 
of the population: developers, new residents, and long-time residents. 
Finally, the results of this study may be skewed due to the fact that the area where 
the survey was taken may have been more homogeneous than the general population.  
Therefore, it is suggested that a telephone survey or a mail survey be conducted to obtain 
a sample from a greater diversity of the population.  Due to the high cost of telephone and 
mail surveys, approximately $10,000 to $15,000 through the Cannon Center at the 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, this survey was conducted as a walk-up survey.  
Additionally, the gender of the respondent should be studied because there may be a 
significant difference in the responses of men and women.
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City of Las Vegas Impact Fee  
Adapted From: James E. Frank, 1989. Survey                                  
                                                                                                                          APPENDIX A 
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1. Check the box under each impact fee now used by your city. N Y N N N Y Y Y N 
2. At what point in the development process is each impact fee assessed? 
a. Subdivision plat approval. 
b. Building permit issuance. 
c. Zoning change approval. 
d. Certificate of occupancy. 
e. Other________________. 
 B    B B B  
3. Indicate if credits are made for other contributions made by the developer. 
a. Land donations (Exactions). 
b. Gasoline taxes paid by new development. 
c. Ad valorem taxes paid by new development. 
d. Other_________________. 
e. No credits are allowed. 
 Y    Y    
4. Does your impact fee ordinance require or allow recalculation of the impact fee amount based on: 
a. An index. 
b. Levels of service in the comprehensive plan. 
c. The capital improvement of the comprehensive plan. 
d. Impact fees are not recalculated. 
 A    A A A  
5. How are impact fees accounted for? 
a. By fee type. 
b. By zone and fee type. 
c. Both (1) and (2). 
d. None of the above. 
 B    B B B  
6. How are impact fee revenues expended? 
a. Building new facilities for new development. 
b. Upgrading existing facilities to serve new development. 
c. Both (1) and (2). 
 B    B B B  
7 a. Please indicate the time limits (# of years) within which the impact fee revenues must be spent, if applicable. 
   b. Have any refunds been made because the time limits have been exceeded. (Yes/No)  
35+ 
No    11 No 9 No 
12 
No  
8. Indicate the impact fees for which payment can be deferred if the impact fee payment is secured by a lien on the property. 
 N/A    N/A N/A N/A  
9. What is the impact fee amount the city charges per square foot for single family residential homes? 
 
$1200 
Per 
Unit 
   
$0.36 
Sq. Ft. 
$500 
Per Unit 
$550 
Per 
Acre 
 
10. Has there been any court actions involving the validity of the city’s authority to levy impact fees? 
 N    N N N  
11. Are impact fees being used to secure bond issues that are financing capital improvements? (Yes/No) 
 N    N N N  
12. Do any of your impact fees include some provision for “affordable” or low-income housing?  Indicate all that apply. 
a. Fees are waived. 
b. Fees are set lower. 
c. Fees are subsidized by the city. 
d. Other. Waived with City Council Approval 
 D    D D D  
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Hello, I am a graduate student at the University of Nevada Las Vegas.  I am conducting a survey to determine what 
the public’s opinion is on the use of development impact fees and exactions.  Let me define what development 
impact fees and exactions are before we start.  A development impact fee is a monetary charge placed upon a 
developer to expand the public facilities such as water and sewer lines, and roads.  A development exaction is the 
dedication of land by a developer to expand facilities such as parks, police and fire stations, and schools.  Please 
choose only one answer per question. 
1. Should impact fees and exactions be used to support new infrastructure such as schools, parks, drainage basins, 
and traffic mitigation? 
# Very strongly agree # Strongly agree #Agree # Strongly disagree #Very strongly disagree 
 
2. Should property taxes be used to support new infrastructure such as schools, parks, drainage basins, and traffic 
mitigation? 
# Very strongly agree # Strongly agree #Agree # Strongly disagree #Very strongly disagree 
 
3. Based on your knowledge, the quality of and availability of school facilities in the Clark County School District 
compared to schools outside of Clark County are? 
# Much better than average # Better than average # Average # Worse than average  
# Much worse than average 
 
4. Compared to other places, the amount of parkland within the Las Vegas Valley is? 
# Much better than average # Better than average # Average # Worse than average  
# Much worse average 
 
5. Compared to other places, the drainage facilities used to control flooding in the Las Vegas Valley are?  # Much 
better average # Better than average # Average # Worse than average 
# Much worse than average 
 
6. New infrastructure should be paid for by? 
# Developers # New residents # Long time residents  # All of the above 
 
7. Did you vote for the continuation of the general obligation bond to support the Clark County School District’s 
facility expansion?  
# Yes  # No  # Didn’t Vote  # Didn’t Live in Clark County 
 
8. Did you vote for the ¼ cent sales tax increase for the Southern Nevada Water Authority’s Lake Mead water line 
expansion?  
# Yes  # No  # Didn’t Vote  # Didn’t Live in Clark County 
9. Would you support higher property taxes to support new infrastructure? 
 # Yes  # No 
 
10. Would you support use of impact fees and exactions if their use increased the cost of housing?  
# Yes  # No 
 
11. What year were you born? 
12. What is your household income range?  # Under 19,999 # 20,000-39,999 # 40,000-59,999 
# 60,000-79,999 # 80,000-99,999 # 100,000 + 
 
13. What is your educational level?  # Elementary School # High school Graduate 
# College Graduate # Graduate School 
 
14. What is your political party affiliation?  # Republican # Democrat # Libertarian 
# Reform # Other 
 
15. Are you a homeowner?    # Yes  # No 
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Descriptive Statistics
101 1.00 2.00 1.6040 .4915
101 1.00 2.00 1.4158 .4953
101 1.00 2.00 1.1980 .4005
101 1.00 2.00 1.3366 .4749
101 1.00 2.00 1.2475 .4337
101 1.00 2.00 1.4752 .5019
101 1.00 3.00 1.9010 .9435
101 1.00 3.00 1.8020 .8720
101 1.00 2.00 1.3663 .4842
101 1.00 2.00 1.5050 .5025
101 1919 1978 1953.11 12.57
101 < $80,000 > $80,000 68118.81 9870.45
101 1 3 2.02 .71
101 1 3 2.31 .72
101 1 2 1.88 .33
101
Should impact fees be used to
support new infrastructure?
Should property taxes be used
to support new infrastructure?
What is the quality of school
facilities in Clark County?
What is the quality of parkland
within the Las Vegas Valley?
What is the quality of drainage
facilities within the Las Vegas
Valley?
Who should pay for new
infrastructure?
Did you vote for the school
bond?
Did you vote for the sales tax
increase?
Would you support higher
property taxes to support new
infrastructure?
Would you support the use of
impact fees if their use
increased the cost of housing?
What year were you born?
What is your household income
level?
What is your education level?
What is your political party
affiliation?
Are you a homeowner?
Valid N (listwise)
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
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Should impact fees be used to support new infrastructure?
61 60.4 60.4 60.4
40 39.6 39.6 100.0
101 100.0 100.0
Strongly
Agree
Agree/
Strongly
Disagree
Total
Valid
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
 
Should impact fees be used to support new infrastructure?
Agree/S. DisagreeStrongly Agree
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 48 -  
APPENDIX D 
 
Should property taxes be used to support new infrastructure?
42 41.6 41.6 41.6
59 58.4 58.4 100.0
101 100.0 100.0
Strongly
Agree
Agree/
Strongly
Disagree
Total
Valid
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
 
Should property taxes be used to support new infrastructure?
Agree/S. DisagreeStrongly Agree
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
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What is the quality of school facilities in Clark County?
20 19.8 19.8 19.8
81 80.2 80.2 100.0
101 100.0 100.0
Better
Than
Average
Average/
Worse
Than
Average
Total
Valid
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
 
What is the quality of school facilities in Clark County?
Average/W.T. AverageBetter Than Average
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
100
80
60
40
20
0
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What is the quality of parkland within the Las Vegas Valley?
34 33.7 33.7 33.7
67 66.3 66.3 100.0
101 100.0 100.0
Better
Than
Average
Average/
Worse
Than
Average
Total
Valid
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
 
What is the quality of parkland within the Las Vegas Valley?
Average/W.T. AverageBetter Than Average
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
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What is the quality of drainage facilities within the Las Vegas Valley?
25 24.8 24.8 24.8
76 75.2 75.2 100.0
101 100.0 100.0
Better
Than
Average
Average/
Worse
Than
Average
Total
Valid
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
 
What is the quality of drainage facilities within the Las Vegas Valley?
Average/W.T. AverageBetter Than Average
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
80
60
40
20
0
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Who should pay for new infrastructure?
48 47.5 47.5 47.5
53 52.5 52.5 100.0
101 100.0 100.0
Developer/
New
Residents
Everybody
Total
Valid
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
 
Who should pay for new infrastructure?
EverybodyDeveloper/New Owners
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
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Did you vote for the school bond?
40 39.6 39.6 39.6
11 10.9 10.9 50.5
50 49.5 49.5 100.0
101 100.0 100.0
Yes
No
Didn't Vote/
Live Here
Total
Valid
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
 
Did you vote for the school bond?
Didn't VoteLive HereNoYes
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
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Did you vote for the sales tax increase?
30 29.7 29.7 29.7
21 20.8 20.8 50.5
50 49.5 49.5 100.0
101 100.0 100.0
Yes
No
Didn't Vote/
Live Here
Total
Valid
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
 
Did you vote for the sales tax increase?
Didn't VoteLive HereNoYes
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
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Would you support higher property taxes to support new infrastructure?
37 36.6 36.6 36.6
64 63.4 63.4 100.0
101 100.0 100.0
Yes
No
Total
Valid
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
 
Would you support higher property taxes to support new infrastructure?
NoYes
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
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Would you support using impact fees if they increased housing costs?
51 50.5 50.5 50.5
50 49.5 49.5 100.0
101 100.0 100.0
Yes
No
Total
Valid
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
 
 
 
Would you support using impact fees if they increased housing costs?
NoYes
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
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What is your household income level?
60 59.4 59.4 100.0
41 40.6 40.6 40.6
101 100.0 100.0
< $80,000
> $80,000
Total
Valid
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
 
What is your household income level?
> $80,000< $80,000
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
70
60
50
40
30
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What is your education level?
26 25.7 25.7 25.7
51 50.5 50.5 76.2
24 23.8 23.8 100.0
101 100.0 100.0
High
School
College
Graduate
School
Total
Valid
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
 
What is your education level?
Graduate SchoolCollegeHigh School
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
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What is your political party affiliation?
46 45.5 45.5 45.5
40 39.6 39.6 85.1
15 14.9 14.9 100.0
101 100.0 100.0
Republican
Democrat
Other
Total
Valid
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
 
What is your political party affiliation?
OtherDemocratRepublican
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
50
40
30
20
10
0
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Are you a homeowner?
89 88.1 88.1 88.1
12 11.9 11.9 100.0
101 100.0 100.0
Yes
No
Total
Valid
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
 
Are you a homeowner?
NoYes
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
100
80
60
40
20
0
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Asymptotic 
Significance 
Levels 
Should impact 
fees be used to 
support new 
infrastructure? 
Would you 
support the 
use of impact 
fees if their 
use increased 
housing costs? 
Should 
property taxes 
be used to 
support new 
infrastructure? 
Would you 
support higher 
property taxes 
to support new 
infrastructure? 
Did you vote 
for the school 
bond? 
Did you vote 
for the sales 
tax increase? 
Who should 
pay for new 
infrastructure? 
Household 
Income Level 
(Asymptotic 
Significance) 
0.922 0.082 0.696 0.993 0.201 0.216 0.539 
Education 
Level 
(Asymptotic 
Significance) 
0.430 0.167 0.367 0.774 0.707 0.914 0.464 
Political Party 
Affiliation 
(Asymptotic 
Significance) 
0.871 0.885 0.604 0.276 0.146 0.309 0.703 
Are You A 
Homeowner 
(Asymptotic 
Significance) 
0.876 0.205 0.995 0.800 0.159 0.167 0.665 
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Should impact fees be used to support new infrastructure? * What is your household income
level?
36 25 61
36.2 24.8 61.0
60.0% 61.0% 60.4%
24 16 40
23.8 16.2 40.0
40.0% 39.0% 39.6%
60 41 101
60.0 41.0 101.0
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
household income level?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
household income level?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
household income level?
Strongly
Agree
Agree/
Strongly
Disagree
Should impact
fees be used to
support new
infrastructure?
Total
< $80,000 > $80,000
What is your household
income level?
Total
 
Chi-Square Tests
.010b 1 .922
.000 1 1.000
.010 1 .922
1.000 .544
.010 1 .922
101
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctiona
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(1-sided)
Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 16.24.b. 
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Should impact fees be used to support new infrastructure? * What is your education level?
13 32 16 61
15.7 30.8 14.5 61.0
50.0% 62.7% 66.7% 60.4%
13 19 8 40
10.3 20.2 9.5 40.0
50.0% 37.3% 33.3% 39.6%
26 51 24 101
26.0 51.0 24.0 101.0
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within What is
your education level?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is
your education level?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is
your education level?
Strongly
Agree
Agree/
Strongly
Disagree
Should impact
fees be used to
support new
infrastructure?
Total
High
School College
Graduate
School
What is your education level?
Total
 
Chi-Square Tests
1.687a 2 .430
1.671 2 .434
1.467 1 .226
101
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum
expected count is 9.50.
a. 
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Should impact fees be used to support new infrastructure? * What is your political party affiliation?
29 23 9 61
27.8 24.2 9.1 61.0
63.0% 57.5% 60.0% 60.4%
17 17 6 40
18.2 15.8 5.9 40.0
37.0% 42.5% 40.0% 39.6%
46 40 15 101
46.0 40.0 15.0 101.0
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
political party affiliation?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
political party affiliation?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
political party affiliation?
Strongly
Agree
Agree/
Strongly
Disagree
Should impact
fees be used to
support new
infrastructure?
Total
Republican Democrat Other
What is your political party affiliation?
Total
 
Chi-Square Tests
.276a 2 .871
.276 2 .871
.131 1 .717
101
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum
expected count is 5.94.
a. 
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Should impact fees be used to support new infrastructure? * Are you a homeowner?
54 7 61
53.8 7.2 61.0
60.7% 58.3% 60.4%
35 5 40
35.2 4.8 40.0
39.3% 41.7% 39.6%
89 12 101
89.0 12.0 101.0
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within Are you
a homeowner?
Count
Expected Count
% within Are you
a homeowner?
Count
Expected Count
% within Are you
a homeowner?
Yes
No
Should impact fees
be used to support
new infrastructure?
Total
Yes No
Are you a homeowner?
Total
 
Chi-Square Tests
.024b 1 .876
.000 1 1.000
.024 1 .877
1.000 .556
.024 1 .877
101
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctiona
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(1-sided)
Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.75.b. 
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Would you support the use of impact fees if their use increased the cost of housing? * What is
your household income level?
26 25 51
30.3 20.7 51.0
43.3% 61.0% 50.5%
34 16 50
29.7 20.3 50.0
56.7% 39.0% 49.5%
60 41 101
60.0 41.0 101.0
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
household income level?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
household income level?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
household income level?
Yes
No
Would you support
the use of impact fees
if their use increased
the cost of housing?
Total
< $80,000 > $80,000
What is your household
income level?
Total
 
Chi-Square Tests
3.033b 1 .082
2.368 1 .124
3.052 1 .081
.106 .062
3.003 1 .083
101
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctiona
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(1-sided)
Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 20.30.b. 
 
 - 67 -  
APPENDIX F 
Would you support the use of impact fees if their use increased the cost of housing? * What is your
education level?
9 29 13 51
13.1 25.8 12.1 51.0
34.6% 56.9% 54.2% 50.5%
17 22 11 50
12.9 25.2 11.9 50.0
65.4% 43.1% 45.8% 49.5%
26 51 24 101
26.0 51.0 24.0 101.0
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within What is
your education level?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is
your education level?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is
your education level?
Yes
No
Would you support
the use of impact fees
if their use increased
the cost of housing?
Total
High
School College
Graduate
School
What is your education level?
Total
 
Chi-Square Tests
3.579a 2 .167
3.623 2 .163
1.990 1 .158
101
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum
expected count is 11.88.
a. 
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Would you support the use of impact fees if their use increased the cost of housing? * What is your political
party affiliation?
24 19 8 51
23.2 20.2 7.6 51.0
52.2% 47.5% 53.3% 50.5%
22 21 7 50
22.8 19.8 7.4 50.0
47.8% 52.5% 46.7% 49.5%
46 40 15 101
46.0 40.0 15.0 101.0
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
political party affiliation?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
political party affiliation?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
political party affiliation?
Yes
No
Would you support
the use of impact fees
if their use increased
the cost of housing?
Total
Republican Democrat Other
What is your political party affiliation?
Total
 
Chi-Square Tests
.244a 2 .885
.244 2 .885
.009 1 .923
101
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum
expected count is 7.43.
a. 
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Would you support the use of impact fees if their use increased the cost of housing? * Are
you a homeowner?
47 4 51
44.9 6.1 51.0
52.8% 33.3% 50.5%
42 8 50
44.1 5.9 50.0
47.2% 66.7% 49.5%
89 12 101
89.0 12.0 101.0
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within Are you
a homeowner?
Count
Expected Count
% within Are you
a homeowner?
Count
Expected Count
% within Are you
a homeowner?
Yes
No
Would you support
the use of impact fees
if their use increased
the cost of housing?
Total
Yes No
Are you a homeowner?
Total
 
Chi-Square Tests
1.604b 1 .205
.920 1 .337
1.630 1 .202
.234 .169
1.589 1 .208
101
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctiona
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(1-sided)
Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.94.b. 
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Should property taxes be used to support new infrastructure? * What is your household income
level?
24 18 42
25.0 17.0 42.0
40.0% 43.9% 41.6%
36 23 59
35.0 24.0 59.0
60.0% 56.1% 58.4%
60 41 101
60.0 41.0 101.0
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
household income level?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
household income level?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
household income level?
Strongly
Agree
Agree/
Strongly
Disagree
Should property
taxes be used to
support new
infrastructure?
Total
< $80,000 > $80,000
What is your household
income level?
Total
 
Chi-Square Tests
.153b 1 .696
.034 1 .853
.152 1 .696
.837 .426
.151 1 .697
101
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctiona
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(1-sided)
Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 17.05.b. 
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Should property taxes be used to support new infrastructure? * What is your education level?
8 22 12 42
10.8 21.2 10.0 42.0
30.8% 43.1% 50.0% 41.6%
18 29 12 59
15.2 29.8 14.0 59.0
69.2% 56.9% 50.0% 58.4%
26 51 24 101
26.0 51.0 24.0 101.0
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within What is
your education level?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is
your education level?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is
your education level?
Strongly
Agree
Agree/
Strongly
Disagree
Should property
taxes be used to
support new
infrastructure?
Total
High
School College
Graduate
School
What is your education level?
Total
 
Chi-Square Tests
2.002a 2 .367
2.036 2 .361
1.905 1 .168
101
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum
expected count is 9.98.
a. 
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Should property taxes be used to support new infrastructure? * What is your political party affiliation?
18 16 8 42
19.1 16.6 6.2 42.0
39.1% 40.0% 53.3% 41.6%
28 24 7 59
26.9 23.4 8.8 59.0
60.9% 60.0% 46.7% 58.4%
46 40 15 101
46.0 40.0 15.0 101.0
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
political party affiliation?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
political party affiliation?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
political party affiliation?
Strongly
Agree
Agree/
Strongly
Disagree
Should property
taxes be used to
support new
infrastructure?
Total
Republican Democrat Other
What is your political party affiliation?
Total
 
Chi-Square Tests
1.008a 2 .604
.994 2 .608
.662 1 .416
101
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum
expected count is 6.24.
a. 
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Should property taxes be used to support new infrastructure? * Are you a homeowner?
37 5 42
37.0 5.0 42.0
41.6% 41.7% 41.6%
52 7 59
52.0 7.0 59.0
58.4% 58.3% 58.4%
89 12 101
89.0 12.0 101.0
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within Are you
a homeowner?
Count
Expected Count
% within Are you
a homeowner?
Count
Expected Count
% within Are you
a homeowner?
Strongly
Agree
Agree/
Strongly
Disagree
Should property
taxes be used to
support new
infrastructure?
Total
Yes No
Are you a homeowner?
Total
 
Chi-Square Tests
.000b 1 .995
.000 1 1.000
.000 1 .995
1.000 .615
.000 1 .995
101
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctiona
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(1-sided)
Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.99.b. 
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Would you support higher property taxes to support new infrastructure? * What is your household
income level?
22 15 37
22.0 15.0 37.0
36.7% 36.6% 36.6%
38 26 64
38.0 26.0 64.0
63.3% 63.4% 63.4%
60 41 101
60.0 41.0 101.0
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
household income level?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
household income level?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
household income level?
Yes
No
Would you support higher
property taxes to support
new infrastructure?
Total
< $80,000 > $80,000
What is your household
income level?
Total
 
Chi-Square Tests
.000b 1 .993
.000 1 1.000
.000 1 .993
1.000 .581
.000 1 .993
101
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctiona
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(1-sided)
Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 15.02.b. 
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Would you support higher property taxes to support new infrastructure? * What is your education level?
11 18 8 37
9.5 18.7 8.8 37.0
42.3% 35.3% 33.3% 36.6%
15 33 16 64
16.5 32.3 15.2 64.0
57.7% 64.7% 66.7% 63.4%
26 51 24 101
26.0 51.0 24.0 101.0
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within What is
your education level?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is
your education level?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is
your education level?
Yes
No
Would you support higher
property taxes to support
new infrastructure?
Total
High
School College
Graduate
School
What is your education level?
Total
 
Chi-Square Tests
.513a 2 .774
.508 2 .776
.439 1 .508
101
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum
expected count is 8.79.
a. 
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Would you support higher property taxes to support new infrastructure? * What is your political party affiliation?
14 15 8 37
16.9 14.7 5.5 37.0
30.4% 37.5% 53.3% 36.6%
32 25 7 64
29.1 25.3 9.5 64.0
69.6% 62.5% 46.7% 63.4%
46 40 15 101
46.0 40.0 15.0 101.0
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
political party affiliation?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
political party affiliation?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
political party affiliation?
Yes
No
Would you support higher
property taxes to support
new infrastructure?
Total
Republican Democrat Other
What is your political party affiliation?
Total
 
Chi-Square Tests
2.576a 2 .276
2.522 2 .283
2.377 1 .123
101
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum
expected count is 5.50.
a. 
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Would you support higher property taxes to support new infrastructure? * Are you a homeowner?
33 4 37
32.6 4.4 37.0
37.1% 33.3% 36.6%
56 8 64
56.4 7.6 64.0
62.9% 66.7% 63.4%
89 12 101
89.0 12.0 101.0
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within Are you
a homeowner?
Count
Expected Count
% within Are you
a homeowner?
Count
Expected Count
% within Are you
a homeowner?
Yes
No
Would you support higher
property taxes to support
new infrastructure?
Total
Yes No
Are you a homeowner?
Total
 
Chi-Square Tests
.064b 1 .800
.000 1 1.000
.065 1 .799
1.000 .535
.063 1 .801
101
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctiona
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(1-sided)
Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.40.b. 
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Did you vote for the school bond? * What is your household income level?
21 19 40
23.8 16.2 40.0
35.0% 46.3% 39.6%
5 6 11
6.5 4.5 11.0
8.3% 14.6% 10.9%
34 16 50
29.7 20.3 50.0
56.7% 39.0% 49.5%
60 41 101
60.0 41.0 101.0
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
household income level?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
household income level?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
household income level?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
household income level?
Yes
No
Didn't
Vote Or
Live Here
Did you
vote for
the school
bond?
Total
< $80,000 > $80,000
What is your household
income level?
Total
 
Chi-Square Tests
3.210a 2 .201
3.223 2 .200
2.299 1 .129
101
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum
expected count is 4.47.
a. 
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Did you vote for the school bond? * What is your education level?
10 18 12 40
10.3 20.2 9.5 40.0
38.5% 35.3% 50.0% 39.6%
2 6 3 11
2.8 5.6 2.6 11.0
7.7% 11.8% 12.5% 10.9%
14 27 9 50
12.9 25.2 11.9 50.0
53.8% 52.9% 37.5% 49.5%
26 51 24 101
26.0 51.0 24.0 101.0
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within What is
your education level?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is
your education level?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is
your education level?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is
your education level?
Yes
No
Didn't
Vote Or
Live Here
Did you
vote for
the school
bond?
Total
High
School College
Graduate
School
What is your education level?
Total
 
Chi-Square Tests
2.159a 4 .707
2.201 4 .699
1.040 1 .308
101
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
2 cells (22.2%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum
expected count is 2.61.
a. 
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Did you vote for the school bond? * What is your political party affiliation?
23 14 3 40
18.2 15.8 5.9 40.0
50.0% 35.0% 20.0% 39.6%
6 4 1 11
5.0 4.4 1.6 11.0
13.0% 10.0% 6.7% 10.9%
17 22 11 50
22.8 19.8 7.4 50.0
37.0% 55.0% 73.3% 49.5%
46 40 15 101
46.0 40.0 15.0 101.0
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
political party affiliation?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
political party affiliation?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
political party affiliation?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
political party affiliation?
Yes
No
Didn't
Vote Or
Live Here
Did you
vote for
the school
bond?
Total
Republican Democrat Other
What is your political party affiliation?
Total
 
Chi-Square Tests
6.823a 4 .146
6.999 4 .136
6.358 1 .012
101
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
2 cells (22.2%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum
expected count is 1.63.
a. 
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Did you vote for the school bond? * Are you a homeowner?
38 2 40
35.2 4.8 40.0
42.7% 16.7% 39.6%
10 1 11
9.7 1.3 11.0
11.2% 8.3% 10.9%
41 9 50
44.1 5.9 50.0
46.1% 75.0% 49.5%
89 12 101
89.0 12.0 101.0
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within Are you
a homeowner?
Count
Expected Count
% within Are you
a homeowner?
Count
Expected Count
% within Are you
a homeowner?
Count
Expected Count
% within Are you
a homeowner?
Yes
No
Didn't
Vote Or
Live Here
Did you
vote for
the school
bond?
Total
Yes No
Are you a homeowner?
Total
 
Chi-Square Tests
3.679a 2 .159
3.917 2 .141
3.589 1 .058
101
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
2 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum
expected count is 1.31.
a. 
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Did you vote for the sales tax increase? * What is your household income level?
15 15 30
17.8 12.2 30.0
25.0% 36.6% 29.7%
11 10 21
12.5 8.5 21.0
18.3% 24.4% 20.8%
34 16 50
29.7 20.3 50.0
56.7% 39.0% 49.5%
60 41 101
60.0 41.0 101.0
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
household income level?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
household income level?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
household income level?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
household income level?
Yes
No
Didn't
Vote Or
Live Here
Did you
vote for the
sales tax
increase?
Total
< $80,000 > $80,000
What is your household
income level?
Total
 
Chi-Square Tests
3.062a 2 .216
3.080 2 .214
2.736 1 .098
101
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum
expected count is 8.52.
a. 
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Did you vote for the sales tax increase? * What is your education level?
9 14 7 30
7.7 15.1 7.1 30.0
34.6% 27.5% 29.2% 29.7%
4 11 6 21
5.4 10.6 5.0 21.0
15.4% 21.6% 25.0% 20.8%
13 26 11 50
12.9 25.2 11.9 50.0
50.0% 51.0% 45.8% 49.5%
26 51 24 101
26.0 51.0 24.0 101.0
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within What is
your education level?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is
your education level?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is
your education level?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is
your education level?
Yes
No
Didn't
Vote Or
Live Here
Did you
vote for the
sales tax
increase?
Total
High
School College
Graduate
School
What is your education level?
Total
 
Chi-Square Tests
.975a 4 .914
.991 4 .911
.004 1 .949
101
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
1 cells (11.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum
expected count is 4.99.
a. 
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Did you vote for the sales tax increase? * What is your political party affiliation?
17 11 2 30
13.7 11.9 4.5 30.0
37.0% 27.5% 13.3% 29.7%
11 7 3 21
9.6 8.3 3.1 21.0
23.9% 17.5% 20.0% 20.8%
18 22 10 50
22.8 19.8 7.4 50.0
39.1% 55.0% 66.7% 49.5%
46 40 15 101
46.0 40.0 15.0 101.0
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
political party affiliation?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
political party affiliation?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
political party affiliation?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
political party affiliation?
Yes
No
Didn't
Vote Or
Live Here
Did you
vote for the
sales tax
increase?
Total
Republican Democrat Other
What is your political party affiliation?
Total
 
Chi-Square Tests
4.798a 4 .309
5.078 4 .279
4.409 1 .036
101
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
2 cells (22.2%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum
expected count is 3.12.
a. 
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Did you vote for the sales tax increase? * Are you a homeowner?
28 2 30
26.4 3.6 30.0
31.5% 16.7% 29.7%
20 1 21
18.5 2.5 21.0
22.5% 8.3% 20.8%
41 9 50
44.1 5.9 50.0
46.1% 75.0% 49.5%
89 12 101
89.0 12.0 101.0
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within Are you
a homeowner?
Count
Expected Count
% within Are you
a homeowner?
Count
Expected Count
% within Are you
a homeowner?
Count
Expected Count
% within Are you
a homeowner?
Yes
No
Didn't
Vote Or
Live Here
Did you
vote for the
sales tax
increase?
Total
Yes No
Are you a homeowner?
Total
 
Chi-Square Tests
3.584a 2 .167
3.764 2 .152
2.659 1 .103
101
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
2 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum
expected count is 2.50.
a. 
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Who should pay for new infrastructure? * What is your household income level?
27 21 48
28.5 19.5 48.0
45.0% 51.2% 47.5%
33 20 53
31.5 21.5 53.0
55.0% 48.8% 52.5%
60 41 101
60.0 41.0 101.0
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
household income level?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
household income level?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
household income level?
Developer/
New
Residents
Everybody
Who should
pay for new
infrastructure?
Total
< $80,000 > $80,000
What is your household
income level?
Total
 
Chi-Square Tests
.378b 1 .539
.170 1 .681
.378 1 .539
.551 .340
.374 1 .541
101
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctiona
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(1-sided)
Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 19.49.b. 
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Who should pay for new infrastructure? * What is your education level?
12 22 14 48
12.4 24.2 11.4 48.0
46.2% 43.1% 58.3% 47.5%
14 29 10 53
13.6 26.8 12.6 53.0
53.8% 56.9% 41.7% 52.5%
26 51 24 101
26.0 51.0 24.0 101.0
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within What is
your education level?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is
your education level?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is
your education level?
Developer/
New
Residents
Everybody
Who should
pay for new
infrastructure?
Total
High
School College
Graduate
School
What is your education level?
Total
 
Chi-Square Tests
1.538a 2 .464
1.540 2 .463
.692 1 .406
101
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum
expected count is 11.41.
a. 
 
 
 
 - 88 -  
APPENDIX F 
Who should pay for new infrastructure? * What is your political party affiliation?
20 21 7 48
21.9 19.0 7.1 48.0
43.5% 52.5% 46.7% 47.5%
26 19 8 53
24.1 21.0 7.9 53.0
56.5% 47.5% 53.3% 52.5%
46 40 15 101
46.0 40.0 15.0 101.0
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
political party affiliation?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
political party affiliation?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is your
political party affiliation?
Developer/
New
Residents
Everybody
Who should
pay for new
infrastructure?
Total
Republican Democrat Other
What is your political party affiliation?
Total
 
Chi-Square Tests
.703a 2 .703
.704 2 .703
.232 1 .630
101
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum
expected count is 7.13.
a. 
 
 
 
 
 - 89 -  
APPENDIX F 
Who should pay for new infrastructure? * Are you a homeowner?
43 5 48
42.3 5.7 48.0
48.3% 41.7% 47.5%
46 7 53
46.7 6.3 53.0
51.7% 58.3% 52.5%
89 12 101
89.0 12.0 101.0
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within Are you
a homeowner?
Count
Expected Count
% within Are you
a homeowner?
Count
Expected Count
% within Are you
a homeowner?
Developer/
New
Residents
Everybody
Who should
pay for new
infrastructure?
Total
Yes No
Are you a homeowner?
Total
 
Chi-Square Tests
.187b 1 .665
.016 1 .901
.188 1 .664
.764 .452
.186 1 .667
101
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctiona
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(1-sided)
Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.70.b. 
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DEFINITION OF TERMS: 
 
Chi-square: A statistic that is the sum of the quotients obtained by dividing the square of 
the difference between the observed and the theoretical values of a quantity by the 
theoretical value (Webster’s 3rd New International Dictionary, 1981). 
Development exaction: A negotiated dedication of land or infrastructure by a developer. 
 
Development impact fee: A monetary fee imposed on a developer in order to pay for 
public infrastructure. 
 
Dependent variable: The variable that is caused or predicted by the independent variable. 
 
Gamma: An ordinal measure of association sensitive to curvilinear relationships.  Gamma 
helps identify the strength of association. 
 
Independent variable: The variable that causes or predicts the dependent variable. 
 
Mean: The arithmetic average for a group of data. 
 
NRS: The Nevada Revised Statutes are the laws set forth by the State of Nevada. 
 
Null hypothesis: The hypothesis that there is no impact or change (nothing happened); 
the working hypothesis phrased negatively. 
 
Public infrastructure: Public infrastructure includes water lines, sewer lines, roads, 
schools, parks, etc. 
 
Proposition 2 ½: A tax reduction initiative in the state of Massachusetts.  
 
Proposition 13: A tax reduction initiative in the state of California. 
 
Rational nexus: A reasonable relationship between the fees or dedications imposed on a 
development and the impact that development has on the existing infrastructure. 
 
Survey sample: A representative group of people from within the population. 
 
Standard deviation: A measure of dispersion, the square root of the average squared 
deviation from the mean. 
 
Z-score: The number of standard deviations an item is from the mean. 
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